Abstract. In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving nonemptiness of approximate ex post cores satisfying incentive compatibility. When the number of agents with private information remains finite, the main argument relies on an adaptation of the small group effectiveness condition, previously proposed for games of complete information. The result goes through when all agents are informationally small.
Introduction
This paper takes up the issue of nonemptiness of the core in interim economies with asymmetric information and exogenous communication. Although Wilson (1978) proved nonemptiness of the largest possible core -the coarse corein convex exchange economies, he also showed that the smallest possible core -the fine core-can easily be empty. When incentive constraints are incorporated, this finding no longer holds; even in well-behaved domains such as quasilinear economies (Forges, Mertens, and Vohra, 2002 ) the incentive compatible coarse core may be empty (Vohra, 1999) .
The current study also restricts attention to quasilinear preferences and focuses on large economies. In cases in which incentive constraints can be dropped, it first argues that cores with endogenous communication are nonempty. More important, when incentive constraints are nontrivial, it adapts results from complete information games, such as Wooders (1994) , which rely on a condition of small group effectiveness (SGE), in order to prove nonemptiness of approximate cores. SGE dictates that all or almost all gains to coalition formation can be realized by partitions of the total player set into relatively small coalitions. SGE holds when there is a small number of informed agents and an unbounded number of uninformed agents; a particular case of interest is what we shall call in Section 3 monopolists of scarce information. When there are many agents of each of a finite number of types, as in Section 4, SGE is equivalent to the apparently mild condition of boundedness of average -per capita-payoffs (Wooders, 1994, Theorem 4) .
Because details of the information structure will in general matter, extending the SGE condition to incomplete information settings is challenging.
We take an indirect route that is sufficient for our purposes. Indeed, we rely on the SGE condition for ex post economies and on the results of Dutta and Vohra (2005) and Kamishiro and Serrano (2011) . These previous results establish that having an ex post core allocation that is incentive compatible is sufficient in quasilinear economies to show that the smallest possible core with endogenous communication be nonempty.
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Thus, this paper focuses mainly on ex post sequences of economies derived from economic data for economies with a finite number of types of agents. These sequences are constructed in such a way that all agents of each type possess exactly the same information and there may be few-even only one -copies of some agents. We focus on sequences in which only one agent is informed and possesses information not available elsewhere in the economy. We establish a nonemptiness of approximate interim cores result when the number of (uninformed) agents becomes sufficiently large. This is done through establishing nonemptiness of approximate ex post cores satisfying incentive compatibility and then appealing to the results described in the previous paragraph. Roughly, the main idea of the result is that, since in any state of the economy the core is nonempty, given ε > 0 from SGE it holds that if the number of uninformed agents is sufficiently large, then each agent with no information can be "taxed" ε and an agent with scarce information paid an amount ε times the number of uninformed agents. Thus, the informed agent is promised a sufficiently large payoff, whatever the state of the world, so that there is no incentive to withhold information.
Finally, as argued in Section 4, our main result extends to large economies in which all agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002) but the reason is different. In such settings, SGE holds because there are no 'scarce types,' that is, there are many copies of each agent. The nontrivial step of establishing the existence of an ex post core al-locations satisfying incentive compatibility relies on a ε-transfer to a residual set of agents who receive signals that are uninformative about the true state of the world.
6 With such transfers ensured, the inclusion of such ex post core allocations in the interim cores with endogenous communication completes the argument, and gives us nonemptiness of any such approximate interim core.
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The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 focuses on the main result, which allows a near-negligible number of informed agents. Section 4 considers sequences of economies in which all agents are informationally small. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
We shall consider a model of an economy with asymmetric information and with many agents whose characteristics are chosen from a finite set. In defining such economies, due to the informational asymmetries, we need to be careful about the distribution of information across agents. We shall first assume that two agents with the same characteristics have exactly the same information. 8 When more than one agent with the same information is present in the economy, informational incentive constraints are absent.
Thus, either there are multiple copies of each informed agent, none of whom have scarce information -each of whom can be viewed as informationally small -or there are informational monopolists. We shall also consider in the sequel (Section 4) a different class of large economies, in which there is a true state of nature and agents private signals concerning the true state are independent.
9 In such a model, agents may be informationally small, but informational incentive constraints are nonvacuous.
Pre-Economies and Economies
We take as given a set of agent characteristics. An agent characteristic includes an endowment, a utility function, and possibly the possession of private information. Each agent in an economy will be described by their characteristic and there may be many agents with each characteristic. 
∏ i∈I T i denote the set of possible states of the world. Obviously, N \ I is the set of agent characteristics in N with no associated private information; by convention,
10 Let q be a probability distribution on T . We assume that no informational type is redundant, i.e., we assume that there is a probability distribution q over T with the property that q(t i ) > 0 for all
9 This sort of model was first considered in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) . 10 Defining the set of states as the product over finite sets of informational types is convenient. The dimensionality of the state space does not increase, even after increasing the number of agents, as is often done in the study of large economies; see, e.g., Serrano, Vohra, and Volij (2001) for such a case with private information.
Let e i ∈ R L + denote the (state-independent) endowment of agent characteristic i ∈ N . For each state t ∈ T and for each i ∈ N let
denote the utility function of agent characteristic i. Note that u i (x i , t) is quasilinear with the L th good as numeraire. We also assume that v i is concave.
We say that (N, I,
..,n , q) comprises a pre-economy. With the specification of numbers of agents with each characteristic, the pre-economy determines an economy with asymmetric information.
A profile on N is a function f from N to Z + , the nonnegative integers;
we interpret f (i) as a number of agents with the same characteristic (that is, agents who are identical in preferences, endowment, and information). Note that a profile f describes a set of agents and their characteristics and thus determines an economy. Given the set of characteristics N and a profile f , define the agent set as
We refer to agent (i, j) as the j-th occurrance of characteristic i.
We define the set of informational types for agent (i, j), denoted by T (i,j) , as T (i,j) = T i for all i ∈ I, j = 1, . . . , f (i). We define T N as the informational type profile of agent set N, that is, T N := ∏ (i,j):i∈I,j=1,...,f (i) T (i,j) . Given a pre-economy and a profile f , we define a probability distribution q f on T N as follows:
otherwise. Let T * N ⊂ T N be the set of informational states that have positive probability. We note that T * N can be identified with T . Then, the utility function of agent (i, j), denoted as u (i,j) , is defined as follows:
Example: We assume that there exists only one agent characteristic (calling this agent characteristic "1") which includes private information. Let
Let us consider a profile f with f (1) = 3, and let T (1,j) be the set of informational type profiles of agent (1, j) (j = 1, 2, 3). We are assuming
but only two of them occur with positive probability -those states of the economy where all agents of characteristic 1 have the same information. That is, the probability distribution q f (on T N ) is as follows:
• The other informational type profiles occur with probability zero, for 3) )}, and we can see that T * N can be identified with T .
∥f ∥ denote the number of agents in a group represented by a profile f , i.e., ∥f ∥ = ∑ i∈N f (i). Given a profile f and a state of the world t, define
Given a state t, the function Ψ (which maps profiles into maximal total utility subject to the feasibility constraint) determines a pre-game, i.e., a pair (N, Ψ), where N is a set of player characteristics and Ψ is a worth function, specifying the total utility achievable by any group of agents. The pair (N, Ψ) is the pre-game determined by the pre-economy (N, I,
given state t. Note that, in deriving the pre-game, from the concavity of utility functions, the maximal total utility achievable by any set of agents using their own resources is achieved by an allocation of commodities that treats all agents of the same characteristic equally. Also, this total utility can be achieved by the group consisting of all agents in the set; that is, we could take the maximum over all partitions of the set of agents but this would not yield a different result.
Interim Economies and Core Notions
For notational simplicity, we denote a typical agent by k instead of (i, j) as long as we do not need to specify an agent characteristic or its specific occurrance.
Given a pre-economy and a profile f , at the interim stage, nature chooses t N ∈ T N , and each informed agent k learns her own t k . Hence, conditional probabilities will be important; for each agent k and every t k ∈ T k , the conditional probability of
Given an economy, let coalition S be a nonempty set of agents. Then we
consists of a commodity bundle for each consumer in S in each state such that (2) is made to exclude basic externalities across coalitions, i.e., the set of feasible allocations to a coalition is independent of the information held by the complement, although this may affect the utilities of agents in the coalition). We will denote by A S the set of feasible deterministic state contingent allocations of S. With confusion being avoided by the context, we shall also use A S to denote the set of feasible deterministic allocations in a given state:
Similarly, recalling that N denotes the set of all agents in the economy, deterministic state contingent N-allocations are simply referred to as deterministic allocations and the set of such deterministic allocations is denoted by A N .
In this paper we assume that coalitions are formed at the interim stage, i.e., after each agent has received her private information but before the state is commonly known. If coalitions are formed at the interim stage, then we need to specify the information that agents in a coalition are allowed to use in constructing an objection to a proposed allocation. Depending on the extent of such communication within a coalition, several interim core concepts have been proposed so far; see Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2002) or Forges and Serrano (2013) for surveys. This paper focuses specifically on interim cores with endogenous information transmission, specifically, the core with respect to (w.r.t.) equilibrium blocking, as explained next.
We shall work in environments in which the information state will not be verifiable, not even when it becomes common knowledge (that is, at the ex post stage). Thus, it is necessary to impose incentive compatibility constraints into the analysis. Given x ∈ A S , the interim utility of agent k ∈ S of informational type t k is:
If agent k has private information t k and misrepresents it by reporting t ′ k (while all other agents are truth-telling), she receives interim utility:
An allocation x ∈ A S is incentive compatible (IC) if for every k ∈ S and for
We denote the set of IC allocations by A * S . Information transmission concerns ruling out some states as impossible, through the identification of smaller events. For an event E ⊆ T and
Consider an allocation rule x ∈ A S , agent k and information t k , and an event
Then the interim utility conditional on E can be expressed as:
The corresponding interim utility (conditional on E) if information t k is falsely reported as t ′ k by agent k, while the others are truth-telling, is:
The set of such allocations is denoted A * S (E). One should view the event E as information acquired by the coalition S, having ruled out states not in E.
The question is whether this information has been acquired "credibly".
The credible core, proposed in Dutta and Vohra (2005) , is the set of incentive compatible allocations immune to credible objections. A coalition has a credible objection if it can identify an informational event such that the informational types t k 's involved in the event are the only informational types that prefer the alternative proposed to the status quo, given that the other agents behave as prescribed in the objection. This self-selection ensures that an agent with a given informational type t k wishes to participate in the objection if and only if it is consistent with the objection's event. Therefore, the information transmitted in the objection via the event is credible in that those agents with t k 's that are not part of it have no incentive to join the objection.
Formally, a coalition S has a credible objection if there exists y
for all k ∈ S and all t k ∈ E k , with strict inequality for some k and t k .
(
S (E). Condition (i) means that there is a product event over which all members of the coalition gain and (ii) implies that it is reasonable for them to believe this event will occur since those t k 's who do not belong to this event would not join the alternative mechanism. Condition (iii) is simply physical and incentive feasibility of the objection.
To potentially destabilize a status quo, Myerson (2007) and Serrano and Vohra (2007) expand coalitional interactions and information transmission to also consider random plans leading to the virtual utility core and the randomized mediated core, respectively. A random coalitional plan µ consists of a collection of probability distributions over feasible allocation rules for various coalitions. In particular, µ(S, y S , t N ), where y S ∈ A S , denotes the probability with which coalition S is receiving y S ∈ A S when the (reported)
state is t N ∈ T N . (We omit the formal definitions of these cores; the reader is referred to the original papers.)
Serrano and Vohra (2007) An incentive compatible allocation x is in the core w.r.t equilibrium blocking of some class of random communication mechanisms whenever there does not exist an equilibrium rejection of x, i.e., a random blocking plan against the status-quo x, for a communication mechanism in that class.
Particular cases of this definition are the following:
• The credible core (Dutta and Vohra, 2005) turns out to be the core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms.
• The virtual utility core (Myerson, 2007) turns out to be the core w.r.t.
equilibrium blocking of measurable random mechanisms.
• The randomized mediated core (Serrano and Vohra, 2007) turns out to be the core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking of unrestricted random mechanisms.
All these notions are interim cores with endogenous information transmission: updated interim utilities are used to evaluate allocations after credible information transmission. It is known that any such core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking is included in the incentive compatible coarse core, defined in Vohra (1999) . In general, the incentive compatible coarse core might be empty, even in quasilinear exchange economies, as shown in Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002) . Our task in this paper is to find sufficient conditions under which exact or approximate notions of even the smallest core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking be nonempty in large quasilinear economies.
Coalition S is said to have an ex post objection to x ∈ A N if there
with strict inequality for some k ∈ S. The ex post core is the set of all allocations to which no coalition has an ex post objection. It is the set of allocations that correspond to the classical core of the (complete information) ex post economy for all t N ∈ T N . Conditions under which the ex post core is nonempty are well-known. In particular, it is nonempty if preferences are continuous, monotonic and convex.
The inclusion of the ex post core allocations satisfying IC in the core w.r.t. 
Proof:
Since f (i) ≥ 2 for all i ∈ I, all the incentive constraints can be dropped (recall the opening paragraph of section 2). Therefore, all ex post allocations satisfy IC, and by Proposition 1, the ex post core, which is nonempty given the classical standard assumptions, is included in any interim core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking.
Our concern in this paper is the treatment of scenarios in which incentive constraints matter. Then, one will have difficulties establishing nonemptiness of exact cores. We shall resort then to approximate cores as a solution to the nonemptiness problem.
Small Group Effectiveness and Approximate Cores
The next property of small group effectiveness (SGE) is not defined for a single economy. The definition applies to all possible economies derived from a given pre-economy, without a specification of a fixed set of agent characteristics. Recall that an allocation is in the core of a game (derived from an economy with quasilinear utilities) if and only if there is an equal-treatment allocation in the core. Thus, given a state of the world t, a profile f and the associated worth Ψ(g, t) and ε > 0, a (feasible) equal-treatment allocation (x j ) j=1,...,n is in the ε-core if and only if for every sub-profile g ≤ f it holds that
Definition
where u i (x i , t) denotes the utility from the allocation x i of characteristic i at informational type profile t.
From an argument identical to that in Proposition 1 in order to show nonemptiness of any approximate core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking, it suffices to prove nonemptiness of the approximate ex post core with incentive compatibility for each state t. We turn to such a result next.
The Main Result: Monopolists of Scarce Information
We analyze sequences of economies featuring monopolists of scarce information. That is, these are sequences in which f (i) = 1 for at least one charac- Remark: In subsection 3.1, we provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of the pre-economy to ensure SGE.
Proof. To obtain a contradiction, let ε 0 > 0 be a number with the property that for each n there is a profile f n , ∥f n ∥ > n, such that the economy with profile f n has an empty 3ε 0 ex post core. We can assume that f n ∥f n ∥ → f for some function f (by restricting attention to a subsequence if necessary).
The first part of the proof is essentially the same as for results for approximate cores of games with transferable utility and complete information.
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The remainer of the proof, constructing an approximate expost incentive compatible core allocation rule is novel.
From SGE in state t ∈ T , there is a bound B such that for any t ∈ T and any profile g on N , for some partition of g into sub-profiles (which could be state-dependent), say {g a : a = 1, . . . , A} where ∥g
In order to prove the proposition, we use a Lemma in Wooders (1992) . From this lemma, there is an integer n 0 and a profile h such that for each n ≥ n 0 , for some integer r n and some profile l n we have
Lemma. Let {f
We will use this fact to construct an approximate ex post core allocation rule.
We note that no agent who has some private information belongs to h.
Let us consider the following allocation rule, which we call z: all of the agents keep their endowment of numeraire, and the allocations of nonnumeraire goods are determined as follows:
• e k , no matter which the state is, (if k is not in the support of h)
• z * k (t), where z * k (t) is an ex post Walrasian allocation (in state t) for agent k in the economy consisting of the agent set h (if j is in the support of h).
We note this allocation rule satisfies both resource constraints and incentive compatibility (if the agents keep their endowment of numeraire), because this allocation rule is state-independent for the informed agents.
Letẑ be the allocation rule obtained by making a transfer of numeraire from z such that:
• each agent k in h gives up ε 0 units of numeraire, and
• each agent k not in h receives M units of numeraire.
Since r n ∥h∥ε 0 > ∥l n ∥M , the above transfer of numeraire is feasible.
We now show thatẑ is in the 2ε 0 -core of the economy in each state.
Suppose not. Then for some state t ∈ T and some coalition S, letting s denote the profile of S, we have 
This implies that for some a
We cannot have the support of s a ′ contained in the support of r n h; otherwise we would have a contradiction to the fact that z * is in the core of any derived economy with profile of the total player set equal to r n h for all n.
Therefore, for at least one i ∈ S a ′ , we must have
gives us a contradiction.
Conditions Ensuring SGE for Pre-economies
In this subsection for simplicity we drop the notation t, indicating the state of the economy, but it should be understood that the analysis concerns an arbitrary ex post state t. We begin by providing a condition that is equivalent to SGE (Wooders, 2010 We find the notion of SGN appealing, however, in view of its natural interpretation in economic models and in models of cooperative games. First, we need to set up the problem to apply Berge's Theorem. Let
Note that since utility functions are strictly concave, maximizing the sum of utilities of an economy with profile f is equivalent to maximizing the sum of utilities over the set of allocations of nonnumeraire commodities that treat all agents of the same characteristic equally. Thus, given f , we can maximize the following weighted sum of utilities:
over the set of allocations x such that
where x i is the allocation to each agent of cohort i. (Note that the maximum of h(x, f ) plus the amount of the numeraire commodity owned by a set of agents with profile f is Ψ(f ).)
From strict concavity of the functions v i it follows that h is strictly concave and continuous. Define the correspondence C mapping F into R n + by
Note that C is a continuous correspondence on F.
Note also that C(f ) is not a compact set since, for example, all agents of one characteristic may be assigned the total endowment of the economy and there may be only one agent of that cohort. The following Lemma shows that, without loss of generality, we can restrict C to a compact set.
Lemma. There exists a constant K such that, for any profile f , if x ∈ C(f ) and x maximizes
Proof of the Lemma. Suppose that the statement of the lemma is false. 
Since utility functions for nonnumeraire commodities are strictly concave the maximum of total utility is achieved with equal marginal utilities for all agents that consume a commodity. Thus, for sufficiently small λ > 0 it must hold that for all characteristics j,
This is impossible since it requires that for all characteristics k, x m ℓk goes to infinity as m grows large. Since endowments e i are fixed, the average allocation of each commodity is bounded and thus the average cannot go to infinity.
Let C be a compact set such that if x ∈ C(f ) and
and (although we do not need it),
Since C is continuous on its entire domain, from Berge's Theorem it follows that h * is also continuous, and that
) is nonempty, compact-valued, and a continuous correspondence.
Since h * is uniformly continuous, it follows that SGN is satisfied.
Relaxing the Assumptions
It is important to understand how much the assumptions under which our results obtain can be relaxed. We discuss relaxations of the informational assumptions in our next section, while here we concentrate on the assumptions made on utility functions.
If we relax only the assumption about the condition on the marginal utilities, then we can already find an example such that the approximate ex post core is empty. (The following example also drops strict concavity.
However, as we explain at the end of this section, we can also find a slight variant of the example satisfying strict concavity. We omit the details of that somewhat more involved example, for expositional reasons.)
Example. There are two goods x and y (y is the numeraire) and two agent characteristics in the original economy. Suppose there are two states s and t. Agent characteristic 1 knows the true state as his own informational type while characteristic 2 is uninformed. Let e 1 = (1, 2) and e 2 = (2, 1). The utility functions are as follows:
This economy violates SGE in both states. We provide the detailed computations for state s (the calculations for state t are similar). In state s, consider a profile with a single agent of characteristic 1, and n 2 agents of characteristic 2, where n 2 is sufficiently large. Then, Ψ(0, n 2 ) = 3n 2 , Ψ(1, 0) = 3.5, Ψ(1, n 2 ) = 1.5(1 + 2n 2 ) + (1 + n 2 ) = 2.5 + 4n 2 , Therefore, Ψ(1, n 2 ) − Ψ(1, 0) − Ψ(0, n 2 ) 1 + n 2 = approximately equal to 1, which stays away from zero, and hence SGE is not satisfied.
That is, in an economy with many agents of characteristic 2 and only one agent of characteristic 1, in state s, whether the agent of characteristic 1 belongs to a coalition or not can have a very large effect on the payoff to that coalition.
Proposition 6
Consider an economy where there is only one agent characteristic 1 and n 2 agents of agent characteristic 2. Let ε < 1 4 . Then for all n 2 , the ex post ε-core with (interim) incentive compatibility is empty.
Proof.
Let (x 1 (·), y 1 (·)), (x 2,j (·), y 2,j (·))(j = 1, 2, . . . , n 2 ) be an allocation rule that belongs to the ex post ε-core with (interim) incentive compatibility.
(1) By the ε-efficiency of the allocation in state s,
The resource constraint of good x in state s is
Combining these two inequalities,
Therefore, x 1 (s) ≥ 1 + 2n 2 − 2(1 + n 2 )ε.
(2) By incentive compatibility in each state, State s: 1.5x 1 (s) + y 1 (s) ≥ 1.5x 1 (t) + y 1 (t).
State t: 2x 1 (t) + y 1 (t) ≥ 2x 1 (s) + y 1 (s).
Combining these two, 1.5x 1 (s) + y 1 (s) + 0.5x 1 (t) ≥ 2x 1 (t) + y 1 (t) ≥ 2x 1 (s) + y 1 (s).
Hence, x 1 (t) ≥ x 1 (s).
(3) The resource constraint of good x in state t is:
(4) By ε-efficiency in state t,
The resource constraint of good x in state t is x 1 (t)+
Combining these two, 2.5
Hence,
If an allocation rule were to satisfy both ( * ) and ( * * ), then 2(1 + n 2 )ε ≥ (1 + n 2 ) − 2(1 + n 2 )ε, then it would hold that ε ≥ 1 4 , a contradiction.
Remark. Almost the same arguments can be applied even if the utility functions are as follows,
where f, g, and h are all strictly concave functions satisfying:
• f ′ (x) < 2 for all x and f is asymptotic to the straight line with slope of 1.5 (i.e., f
• g ′ (x) < 1.5 for all x, and
As in the previous proof, steps 1 and 4 can be shown because in state s the marginal utility of good x for characteristic 1 is greater than the one of characteristic 2 for all amounts of x, while in state t the marginal utility of good x for characteristic 2 is greater than the one of characteristic 1 for all amounts of x. 
Informational Smallness in Signal-Based Processes

Notation and definitions
Since the model employed in this section is slightly different from that used in the rest of the paper, we begin with a few preliminaries in order to define i ∈ N might receive and let T = ∏ i∈N T i . We take as given a probability distribution, denoted by P , on Θ × T . We assume that for every θ, θ ′ with
The consumption set of each agent with each characteristic, denoted by
endowment of characteristic i in state θ ∈ Θ. The preferences of an agent 14 That is, there are many close substitutes for each agent. As noted in the introduction if there are no agents of scarce types then SGE is equivalent to simply boundedness of per capita payoffs (Wooders, 1994, Theorem 4) .
with characteristic i are given by a utility function u i : R
is the utility function of each agent with characteristic i in state θ. We note that in this model the utility functions do not depend on T but do depend on the state of nature. The collection E = ({u i , X i , e i , T i } i∈N , Θ, P ) will be called a private information pre-economy.
An allocation rule x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for the private information pre-economy is a collection of functions x : T → A N . For each state θ ∈ Θ, the collection {u i (·, θ), e i } i∈N defines an associated (complete information) pre-economy.
In this section, we confine our discussion to exact replicas; that is, sequences of economies where the r th economy has r agents of each characteristic. This yields simpler mathematical expressions and more transparent arguments.
15 That is, we consider only profiles f such that
Given a pre-economy E and a profile f , let
be a private information economy, with ∥f ∥(= M × n for some integer M ) agents, satisfying the following conditions. (Hereafter we denote
f is a probability distribution on Θ × T f satisfying the following 16 :
15 Extending our results for the case of more general sequences is an open question; we explain some of its difficulties in the sequel. Note, however, that since agents of different characteristics may be identical, the restriction to replica sequences is not as restrictive as it might first seem.
16 These sequences are called conditionally independent replicas in McLean and Postlewaite (2002).
(a) For each j = 1, 2, . . . , M , and each (θ, t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ Θ × T ,
(b) for each θ, the probability distributions over
are independent given θ.
Thus, E f is a private information economy with ∥f ∥ agents containing M agents of each characteristic i ∈ N . It follows that, if M is sufficiently large for all i, then with high probability, by the law of large numbers, some state will be assigned probability near 1. We note that no agent's information is redundant in this process: regardless of the number of copies, each agent still has information that cannot be inferred from the aggregate information of other agents.
Let N be the agent set given the set of characteristics and profile f . For each S ⊆ N, S-feasible allocation rules are of the form z : T S → A S , where signals are independent conditional on the state and the matrix of conditional probabilities of the signals given the state is given by the following table.
P P P P P P P P P state signal
Here, ρ satisfies 1/2 < ρ < 1. (If ρ is close to 1, then the signal is very accurate.) An allocation rule determines feasible assignments by using agents' signals.
In this setup, regardless of the (fixed) accuracy of the agents' signals, every agent will become informationally small as the number of agents increases: with high probability sellers are not able to change the estimated state by misreporting their signals when other sellers announce truthfully.
By the law of large numbers, if r is sufficiently large, then the number of sellers who receive t G will be either around ρr or around (1 − ρ)r. In the next subsection we will define the set of such signal profiles as B N F and B F , respectively. If r is sufficiently large, then the signal profile would belong to either B N F or B F with probability almost one.
A feasible allocation for S,
Our use of the term ex post in this section refers to events that occur after the realization of the signal profile t N , but before the realization of the state θ (allocations can depend on agents' signals but not on θ, which is assumed to be unobservable).
Coalition S is said to have an ex post objection to z if there exist y S ∈ A S and t ∈ T N such that
for all k ∈ S. The ex post core is the set of all allocation rules to which no coalition has an ex post objection.
Nonemptiness of the Approximate Core
McLean and Postlewaite (2002) We construct an incentive compatible mechanism that is slightly different than the one considered by McLean and Postlewaite (2002) (Here, B s can be interpreted as the set of signal profiles such that the true state is estimated as θ s with almost probability one.)
The restriction to replicas can be explained with the following technical remark. The numberM depends upon the allocation ζ defined for the preeconomy. In other words, we have to pick an allocation in each state before setting the numberM . This makes it difficult to argue the case of more general sequences, beyond replicas.
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From this lemma, we can obtain the following nonemptiness result of the approximate core. Proof : Given ε > 0, let
and η := ε 1 + K , These imply that
Thus we conclude that
contradicting the assumption that (ζ k (θ s )) k∈N is a Walrasian allocation of the associated economy in state θ s , which therefore must belong to the core of the M × n agents' economy.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has offered a number of nonemptiness results for interim cores in sufficiently large quasilinear economies. When incentive constraints can be dropped, one can easily adapt arguments in previous literature to show nonemptiness of any exact interim core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking.
When incentive constraints still matter, however, either because of exclusive information or because of independent informational types in signalbased processes, the exact core may be empty. For such cases, we have shown how adapting the condition of small group effectiveness is useful in order to prove the nonemptiness of any approximate interim core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking in sequences of economies based on a pre-economy. The key argument, which is also applied in signal-based replica processes, relies on finding ex post core allocations that pass the interim incentive compatibility test.
Since the inclusion of the incentive compatible ex post core in the interim cores with endogenous communication holds for every quasilinear economy, once a sufficiently large economy is found with the approximate interim core being nonempty, any replica of such a large economy (considering different kinds of replicas, such as ex post, independent, or signal-based, as done in Kamishiro and Serrano (2011) ) also preserves our nonemptiness results, thereby extending the classes of information structures that are compatible with nonempty approximate cores.
